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ABSTRACT. In regulatory practice, the principle of precaution is hardly linked to
the ideal of sustainable development. In this article, we argue that it should be. We
argue that sustainable development is the sense of an ethics of co-responsibility,
while precaution is the attitude needed to realize this sense. From this perspective, we
comment on some regulatory practices within the European context regarding
authorization requests for deliberate releases of genetically modiﬁed crops and show
some problems that are popping up there, for example, the diﬃculties in interpreting
the meaning of ‘‘harm’’ (and of ‘‘beneﬁt’’), the symptomatic gap between regulatory
rule and political practice. Finally, we suggest that, in order to respond to such
problems, precaution should ﬁnd an appropriate translation in the ﬁelds of both
research and innovation policy, of authorization policy and of economic policy.
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ABBREVIATIONS: EEA – European Environment Agency, GMC – Genetically
Modiﬁed Crop, GMO – Genetically Modiﬁed Organism, FRDO – Federal Council
for Sustainable Development (Belgium), IMSA – Institute for Environment and
Systems Analysis (the Netherlands), INRA – National Institute for Agricultural
Research (France), NBC – National Biosafety Commission (Spain), NGO – Non-
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1. INTRODUCTION
The precautionary principle has a European history of about four decades
now (O’Riordan and Cameron, 1994). During this period, many authors
complained about its ambiguous and vague meaning (Bodansky, 1991;
Dovers and Handmer, 1995; Morris, 2002; Starr, 2003), and many texts were
written in order to make its meaning more concrete and, consequently, to
make the concept operational in a more unequivocal way (O’Riordan and
Cameron, 1994; Raﬀensperger and deFur, 1999; Sandin, 1999; Treich, 2000;
Calman and Smith, 2001; Haag and Kaupenjohann, 2001; O’Riordan et al.,
2001; DeKay et al., 2002; Lo¨fstedt et al., 2002; Mayer and Stirling, 2002;
Sandin et al., 2002; Van den Belt and Gremmen, 2002; Henry and Henry,
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2003; Ricci et al., 2003; Tickner, 2003). In most of these texts the link between
precaution and sustainable development remains unclear or is even absent.
In this article, we argue, ﬁrst, that precaution should be explicitly related
to sustainable development. And we investigate how this relationship
inﬂuences the meaning of the precautionary principle. In a second part, we
analyze interpretations of the precautionary principle as we ﬁnd them in
European and Belgian regulatory texts and practices. In a ﬁnal part, we oﬀer
some recommendations for a public policy that is precautionary in a deeper
sense, i.e., in the sense of sustainable development.
2. PLACING THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECAUTION IN CONTEXT
According to Boehmer-Christiansen, the German concept of Vorsorge
integrates three meanings: caring for, worrying about, and obtaining pro-
visions (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994). In order to help us clarify the con-
crete meaning of each of these verbs, we could start with a reﬂection on the
following questions. Should the choice of newly developed technological
applications be subordinate to predeﬁned goals, or should the choice of the
goals to be realized be subordinate to already developed technological
applications? Should the freedom of producers and consumers be subordi-
nate to commonly shared visions on humane conditions of existence both
for present and future generations, or should present and future conditions
of existence be subordinate to the maximum freedom – even in the sense of a
just distribution between present and future generations – of producers and
consumers? Answers to these questions cannot be of a black-or-white type.
For, to start with, it does not make so much sense to deﬁne abstract societal
goals that are hardly connected to (presumed) technological possibilities on
the one hand. And new technological applications are not developed in
complete independence from already existing societal goals on the other
hand. There always exists some reciprocity between (dominant) societal
goals and (dominant) technological developments. Something comparable
holds for the relationship between consumers’ and producers’ freedom and
visions on humane conditions of existence. The kinds of freedoms that get
legally protected and (dominant) interpretations of humane conditions of
existence are inﬂuencing each other mutually. Both questions rather express
a need to make these reciprocities and mutual inﬂuences more explicit and
to create, as a consequence, possibilities to adjust them.1 This need is
illustrated by the many controversies – both scientiﬁc and societal – that
exist concerning societal introductions of new technological applications
1 See also Goorden (2003).
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It is a worldwide phenomenon that introductions of new technologies give
rise to a lot of scientiﬁc and societal controversies. The acceptance of Pre-
caution as a European policy principle can be seen as a conﬁrmation by na-
tional andEuropean public authorities of the relevance of these controversies,
given a growing awareness of the possibly huge impacts of new technologies –
both positive and negative. In our view, these controversies testify to a need to
recalibrate the choices and values embedded in these technologies on the one
hand and visions and concerns of the wider public on the other. What makes
this recalibration exercise unavoidable? And what is the aim of it?
2.1. Responsibility for the Future
The reason why this recalibration exercise has to be done, according to
Jonas, is because of the technological capabilities present in our modern
Western societies (Jonas, 1984). Contrary to pre-modern times, human
technological and scientiﬁc powers are such that the natural conditions of
human existence can be altered, either gradually or suddenly. Nature – both
the nature of living beings and their environment – proves to be susceptible
to the interferences of modern technologies. Our climate shows changes due
to the use of greenhouse gases and fossil fuels. (Agro-)industrial practices
threaten existing biodiversity. The use (or misuse) of nuclear energy – either
for applications during peace or war times – threaten the genetic codes of
living beings. We are capable of radical changes, both in the short and the
very long run and both locally and globally. And because we are capable, we
are responsible. It is the dimension of modern, industrial technological
powers and the possible threats they entail for the natural conditions of
human existence that make a recalibration between the values and choices
inherent in technological applications, on the one hand, and human con-
cerns and expectations, on the other, unavoidable.
From now on, according to Jonas, acting technologically is acting in an
ethically sensitive way. Our responsibility for humans urges us to take
responsibility for nature, since human conditions of existence depend on it.
However, this responsibility does not any longer remain restricted to what
happens here and now, because the – often unpredictable, cumulative and
irreversible – eﬀects of our technological actions extend widely in time and
space. Our responsibility is, therefore, a responsibility for the future arising
from our collective technological acting.
2.2. Responsibility for the Future as Culpable Ignorance
This responsibility is, moreover, rather handicapped, for our technological
power for acting largely goes beyond our scientiﬁc power for predicting the
eﬀects thereof and our moral power for judging them. Ian Hacking’s
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concept of ‘‘culpable ignorance,’’ nevertheless, prevents an easy evasion
from our responsibility because of this handicap (Kaiser, 2003, p. 43). The
responsibility connected to the Principle of Precaution is an example of
‘‘culpable ignorance.’’ ‘‘The precautionary principle implies the need, as a
matter of cultural change, for society’s institutions to enlarge existing
notions of ethical responsibility to encompass these unknowns, which are pre-
dictable in principle even though not in speciﬁcs’’’(Harremoe¨s, 2002, p. 215).
2.3. A Rupture?
Jonas does not convince us completely. We admit that the scope of modern
technological eﬀects on the natural conditions of human existence, both in
time and in space, is many times larger than it was before. This conclusion,
however, does not justify the radical rupture Jonas seems to draw between
modern and less modern technologies. In his view, modern technologies are
ethically sensitive, while previous ones are not. In our view, not only modern
technological applications can induce societal discontent. Throughout hu-
man history we can ﬁnd examples of technologies that had very negative
eﬀects on the conditions of existence of particular groups in society.
Admittedly, these conditions of existence are often no less related to social
than to natural circumstances. We see, however, no reason why our tech-
nological capability of changing social conditions is less important than our
technological capability of changing natural conditions. Both capabilities
(or both dimensions of our capabilities) can induce the need for a recali-
bration between technological applications and societal expectations. Both
capabilities imply responsibilities.
2.4. The Relevance of the Economic Context
And sure, the social or natural eﬀects of a technological application are not
necessarily intrinsically connected with the technology itself. The economic
context in which and the economic objectives for which a speciﬁc applica-
tion is selected and put into action can often (help to) explain the extent and
gravity of its eﬀects. Not so much our technological acting, but our tech-
nological acting within a particular economic context is an ethically sensitive
acting. The need for a recalibration exercise thus rather emerges from a lack
of adjustment of the norms and values embodied in the economic freedoms
to select and implement particular technological applications on the one
hand and (considered) societal norms and values on the other.2
2 See, for instance, the recent FAO report The State of Food and Agriculture 2003–
2004 (http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5160E/Y5160E00.HTM; date of consulta-
tion: 27/05/04).
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2.5. Sustainable Development as the Sense of the Recalibration Exercise
According to Jonas, the sense of a recalibration exercise is to safeguard the
humanity of the conditions of existence of both present and future gener-
ations. Maintaining humane conditions of existence (in the near and far
future) has become a decision criterion for our technological acting. This
responsibility is total, continuous, and future-oriented.
We are totally responsible: not only for the material needs, but for
everything that enables human beings to develop in a humane way
(knowledge, social and moral skills, practical and cultural skills, societal
structures, and so on). Human beings are, indeed, in the ﬁrst place
responsible for the ability of other human beings to bear (in due course)
their own responsibility and to give shape to their own humaneness.
We are continuously responsible: our responsibility never stops. Our
responsibility has a historical dimension: it relates the past with the present
and the future. It recognizes what has been handed down – both positive
and negative deeds, both failed and performed actions – and asks itself how
to integrate them in the future of the people who will live in the future. It
regards the tradition of a collective humane identity.
We are in the ﬁrst place responsible for the future. A paradox is at the
back of this. We are responsible for a future that escapes the eﬀectiveness of
our actions. For the results of our actions are unpredictable. They escape
our control. We cannot be responsible for the concrete deeds of future
generations. For this is precisely the aim of our responsibility towards the
future: we should not so much ﬁx the future, but create the conditions so
that those living in the future will be able to create their own concrete lives
and to bear responsibility for their own future.
We could apply a more recent terminology to Jonas’s ethics of respon-
sibility: the sense of a recalibration exercise is Sustainable Development. The
responsibility emerging from our technological possibilities regards the
realization of sustainable conditions of existence. This responsibility does
not remain restricted to the natural/environmental dimensions of human
conditions of existence. It regards no less their social and economic
dimensions.
2.6. A Public Ethic
The ethics of responsibility for Sustainable Development belongs to the
sphere of public policy, not so much to the private sphere of human
relationships. It applies to the collective acting of humans because of the
possible eﬀects of this collective acting on the continued existence of
humanity. This interpretation sounds like an anachronism. We are not used
any more to think of public authorities as moral entities. We are rather used
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to interpret public authorities as utilitarian institutions that should defend
the safety of their citizens, but without interfering with the (predeﬁned)
freedoms of producers and consumers (compare with Calman and Smith,
2001, p. 193).
2.7. An Ethic of Co-responsibility
The ethics of responsibility for Sustainable Development is, moreover, an
ethics that should be publicly deﬁned or, in the words of Mitcham and von
Schomberg (2000), an ethics of collective co-responsibility.3 In order to
make the concept of Sustainable Development concrete with regard to
technological developments, public debates are needed. Individual scientists,
engineers, and experts cannot take responsibility for their discoveries and
engineering designs, because these discoveries and designs get transplanted
into the subsystems of economy, politics, and law and, hence, transformed
according to the speciﬁc logics of these subsystems. These system logics are
not traceable to the intentions of particular individuals, nor are the possible,
but unintended and often not assessable consequences of the transplanted
and transformed scientiﬁc and technological applications.
Therefore, all citizens should respond personally. Personal responsive-
ness means that individual participation in public debates is the default
position: persons must give reasons for being excused from such a duty.
Public deliberation serves the function of presenting diﬀerent relevant issues
to the more or less autonomous systems and subsystems of society, i.e., to
politics, law, science, and so on. Appropriate exchanges between the various
subsystems and the wider public are needed. Representatives of these sub-
systems need to respond to publicly identiﬁed and articulated issues. Con-
versely, they are drivers for new debates when they publicize particular
aspects of an issue that cannot be fruitfully resolved within the limits of the
typical specialized discourse of the subsystem they belong to.
2.8. Sustainable Development is the Sense, Precaution is the Attitude
Sustainable Development is the sense of our responsibility; Precaution is the
attitude that is necessary in order to realize it.4
Why do we need to be precautionary? New technological applications
place us before ever new situations. Consequently, in order to judge these
3 Karl-Otto Apel developed the idea of an ethic of co-responsibility. Contrary to
Jonas, who grounds his ethics of responsibility in a teleological metaphysics, namely
the integrity of nature, Apel grounds it in discourse ethics (Lin, 2003, pp. 18–50).
4 See also Dommen, E. (ed.) (1993). Fair principles for sustainable development.
Essays on environmental policy and developing countries.
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new situations, we cannot fall back on previous experiences. If our scientiﬁc
predicting power were reaching as far as the causal scope of our tech-
nological acting, we would not need to be precautionary. This is, how-
ever, not possible. And this is, according to Jonas (and Arendt), not a
completely new phenomenon. Scientiﬁc predicting power is by deﬁnition
not adequate with respect to political acting: the spontaneity typical for
political acting makes it ‘‘irrational’’ from a scientiﬁc perspective. The
possibly huge scope, both in time and space, and irreversibility of the
eﬀects of new technologies add, however, a new dimension. We are aware
that present-day technological applications can possibly disturb the
human conditions of existence thoroughly and without leaving us the
opportunity to regain control. It is this dimension that urges us to take
responsibility in a precautionary way.
What does such a precautionary attitude stand for? Since Precaution is
an attitude needed to realize Sustainable Development, it should be
translated into goal-oriented procedures.5 In a goal oriented approach
Precaution plays its part during the whole process of selecting public goals
and feasible alternatives. It does not only come in when there is suﬃcient
evidence that a certain activity or technological application turns out to be
suﬃciently harmful. The central question is, which range of activities is
feasible and acceptable to reach a speciﬁc goal? Considering a suﬃcient
variety of alternatives in function of a predeﬁned goal inﬂuences the
quality of risk evaluations in a positive sense. Less reason exists to avoid
uncertainties. It is important to make our uncertainties and ignorance –
emerging from the lead of our technological power on our scientiﬁc
predicting power – explicit with dedication of all the scientiﬁc knowledge
and skills we have. However, every alternative is considered and the
evaluation is not restricted to an evaluation of risks and uncertainties. The
appraisal of possible advantages is as important. In addition the concept
‘‘evaluation’’ gets a wider sense. Not only the eﬀects for the environment
or for human health are relevant for the goal aimed at, but also social,
cultural, political, economic, aesthetic, and distributive eﬀects. The ﬁnal
decision regards the choice of the most promising alternative (or the most
promising set of alternatives) in function of the goal aimed at. In this
sense, a goal oriented approach stimulates technological innovation.
A goal oriented approach presupposes a continuous learning process, for
scientists concerned as well as for citizens and policy people. Since the
implementation of various alternatives involves many uncertainties, a
continuous monitoring of eﬀects is necessary. Some alternatives can be
5 Mary O’Brien distinguishes between a goal-oriented and a harm-oriented pre-
cautionary approach (O’Brien, 2003).
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more and others less harmful than initially expected. Or it can turn out
that one urgently needs to look for new alternatives. Cooperation from all
sides of a society and transparent participatory political processes are a
condition to achieve public environmental and public health goals.
To summarize, precaution as an attitude in the service of Sustainable
Development implies (a) the deﬁnition of concrete goals and a variety of
technologies and practices that can contribute to these goals, (b) a com-
parison between technologies and practices regarding their respective envi-
ronmental, social, economic risks and beneﬁts, (c) deliberative processes in
order to integrate public concerns and visions into the deﬁnition of goals,
the deﬁnition and monitoring of risks and beneﬁts, and the decision-making
concerning a feasible and desirable variety of technologies and technological
practices, and (d) an iterative process.
3. A COMPARISON OF INTERPRETATIONS
Diﬀerences between the precautionary policies of Europe and the US gen-
erate trade disputes, for example with regard to genetically modiﬁed crops
and food. One can, however, doubt whether these disputes relate to diﬀerent
interpretations of the Precautionary Principle as such or to its application
with regard to particular products and technologies in particular cultural,
legal, political, and economic contexts. Both Jasanoﬀ (2003) and Wiener
and Rogers (2002) question the conventional wisdom that sees the European
Union as endorsing the Precautionary Principle and proactively regulating
uncertain risks, while the United States opposes that PP and waits for evi-
dence of harm before regulating. According to Wiener and Rogers, who
investigated several cases – hormones in beef and milk production, mad cow
disease in beef and blood donations, genetically modiﬁed foods and crops –
precautionary attitudes of both Europe and US vary enormously. ‘‘Neither
the EU nor the US can claim to be categorically ‘more precautionary’ than
the other. The real pattern is complex and risk-speciﬁc’’ (Wiener and
Rogers, 2002, p. 317).
Jasanoﬀ pleads for a resurrection of the Precautionary Ideal in the
context of the US (Jasanoﬀ, 2003, pp. 236–239). We argue that her rec-
ommendation is also valid for the European context and, moreover, in line
with the interpretation of the Precautionary Principle that we suggest,
namely precaution as a particular attitude in the service of Sustainable
Development.
In this section, we will analyze applications of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple as they emerge in European regulatory texts and practices (and in
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assessment practices of the Belgian Biosafety Council).6 We will investigate
to what extent these applications show the various characteristics we ana-
lyzed as being important. We analyzed precaution as an attitude with some
substantial characteristics: it takes (a) predeﬁned goals as its starting point,
(b) deﬁnes technologies and technological practices in function of these
goals, and (c) evaluates and compares the risks and beneﬁts of this variety of
suitable technologies and practices with regard to both their environmental,
ethical, social, and economic impacts. Precaution is, moreover, an attitude
with some procedural characteristics: it is (a) a continuous learning process,
(b) that integrates public concerns and visions during the whole process, and
(c) that takes the economic context with its particular power relationships
into consideration.
3.1. Discrepancies Between Regulatory Documents and Regulatory Practices
In the European regulatory context, the Communication of the European
Commission on the Precaution Principle (COM, 2000) is an important
policy document.7 This Communication places the precautionary principle
within the existing framework of risk analysis (Lo¨fstedt, 2004, p. 246).
‘‘Application of the precautionary principle is part of risk management,
where scientiﬁc uncertainty precludes a full assessment of the risk and
when decision makers consider that the chosen level of environmental
protection of human, animal and plant health may be in jeopardy’’ (COM,
2000, p. 13).
The communication starts from the assumption that the Precaution
Principle is, initially, a management principle that is triggered when
potentially dangerous impacts of a phenomenon, product, or process are
stated and a scientiﬁc evaluation cannot determine the risks with suﬃcient
certainty. The latter condition implies that a scientiﬁc evaluation that is as
complete as possible and that explains the degrees of uncertainty connected
to it is a precondition to take precautionary measures. The communication
reminds that the risk perception inducing a scientiﬁc evaluation is rather of a
practical than a theoretical kind. It stresses, further, that a precautionary
decision is in the last resort a political decision and that its correctness
depends on the societal acceptability of the risks society will have to bear.
6 Because of the experiences the authors of this article have with some Belgian
regulatory practices, either as a member of a scientiﬁc advisory committee to the
Biosafety Council, or through the Science and Precaution in Interactive Risk Eval-
uation (SPIRE) research project (see for more information on this research project
www.ua.ac.be/SPIRE).
7 From now on we will refer to this document as ‘‘the Communication.’’
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The guidelines for application that are proposed in the communication
on precaution are proportionality, non-discrimination, coherence, consid-
ering costs and beneﬁts of both acting and non-acting, considering scientiﬁc
developments. These guidelines are comparable to the ones that should be
applied when other – rather preventative than precautionary – management
measures are to be taken.
The European Environment Agency produced a report entitled Late
lessons from Early Warnings that provides, with the help of several case
studies, justiﬁcation for the use of the precautionary principle. In this report,
however, the European Commission’s interpretation of precaution as a risk
management principle is questioned. The report stresses that regulators
should,
 ‘‘ensure use of ‘lay’ and local knowledge, as well as relevant specialist
expertise in the appraisal
 ensure that real world conditions are adequately accounted for in the
regulatory appraisal
 take full account of the assumptions and values of diﬀerent social groups
 avoid ‘paralysis by analysis’ by acting to reduce potential harm when
there are reasonable grounds for concern’’ (EEA, 2001, pp. 168–169 cited
in Lo¨fstedt, 2004, pp. 247–248).
According to Lo¨fstedt one can question whether recent EU rulings
actually abide by EU’s communication (Lo¨fstedt, 2004, pp. 248–249). Both
the EU Chemical White Paper and the European Commission Consultation
Document on Chemical Regulation call for substances that are persistent,
bio-accumulative or known endocrine disrupters to be subject to authori-
zation, in eﬀect leading to a general ban on substances deemed very high
concern. This illustrates that Europe deems the use of the precautionary
principle justiﬁed even without backing from scientiﬁc committees. Simi-
larly, two important legal rulings by the Court of First Instance reaﬃrmed
that precaution should not always be interpreted as part of a risk assess-
ment. These cases arose from a 1999 EU regulation banning antibiotic
additives in animal feed on the basis that bacterial resistance to antibiotics
might be transferred to humans (though there was no reputable scientiﬁc
evidence that there was such a transfer).
Comparable discrepancies between regulatory documents and practices
are obvious with regard to authorization procedures for GMO releases. The
European Communities’ Deliberate Release Directives 90/220 and its suc-
cessor 2001/18 were designed to manage scientiﬁc and political uncertainty
about hazards of genetically modiﬁed organisms. These Directives are
implicitly precautionary as far as they regulate a priori entire categories
of products for which there was no prior evidence of harm (Levidow, 2001,
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p. 849). They are explicitly precautionary as far as they declare the pre-
cautionary principle as their ﬁrst priority. Precaution, then, means that
intended releases should be assessed case-by-case and step-by-step and that
this assessment should be based on expert advice concerning the biosafety,
i.e., safety for human health and for the environment (including biodiver-
sity), of the release at stake. The scientiﬁc character of the assessment is
intended to contribute to an objective and harmonious treatment of the
dossiers. Objective and harmonious procedures should support and stimu-
late scientiﬁc research and innovation, avoid unequal conditions of com-
petition, eliminate impediments – between and within EU countries – while
developing and bringing onto the market products containing GMOs
(Mayer and Stirling, 2002, p. 58). They should, moreover, provide GMO
ﬁrms with a transparent legal and administrative frame.
Directive 2001/18/EC provides, further, general guidelines concerning
the ethical and social aspects of deliberate releases. The ‘‘European Group
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies’’ may be consulted in order to
obtain advice on ethical issues of a general nature. Member States of the EU
retain, moreover, a competence of their own as regards ethical issues
(COGEM, 2003, p. 19). The latter statement remains, however, to a certain
extent a dead letter, partly because the European member states that are
willing to integrate social and ethical issues are still trying out suitable
procedures (e.g., the Netherlands), partly because most of the member states
doubt the sincerity of this statement, since concrete substantial and/or
procedural recommendations are lacking.
Social conﬂict within many European member states has been pre-
venting a straightforward application of European GMO Directives. The
lifting of the moratorium established at a European level in 1998 is still
in coming.8 Some national Biosafety Commissions shifted their regula-
tory practices to a certain extent in response to public opinion. In Spain,
for instance, the NBC (National Biosafety Commission) uses input from
public debate to assess certain public concerns even if it does not form
part of its own formal risk assessment protocol (Todt, 2004, pp. 150–
151). The NBC’s formal risk assessment protocol requires the evaluation
of the pathogenicity, genetic stability, dissemination and survival of
GMOs, eﬀects on other organisms and gene transfer. Informally, how-
ever, it evaluates a number of additional health and environmental issues
raised by NGOs in the public debate, for instance, the use of marker
genes resistant to antibiotics, the development of resistance in pests to
insect resistant crops as well as the eﬀects of these crops on populations
of beneﬁcial (non-target) insects, and issues related to herbicide use.
8 Environment Daily 1671 (19/05/2004); Environment Daily 1689 (17/06/04).
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Moreover, the NBC applied, in a few isolated cases, an implicit tech-
nology assessment. Although the scope of the European GMO Directives is
limited to evaluating health and environmental eﬀects and deciding about
the acceptability of those eﬀects, the NBC assessed, for instance, the overall
impact on herbicide use of herbicide resistant crops. It, thus, assessed the
expected beneﬁts and compared them to possible risks or costs. Further-
reaching demands, like the evaluation of the technology’s socio-economic
eﬀects, its impact on traditional agriculture or its eﬀects on the North–
South relationship, are, however, still excluded by the Commission from
the evaluations (Todt, 2004, p. 156).
In Belgium, the Biosafety Advisory Council is responsible for assessing
authorization requests for deliberate releases of GMOs (http://www.
biosafety-council.be). The Section on Biosafety and Biotechnology (SBB) of
the (federal) Institute of Public Health acts as the secretariat of the Council
(http://biosafety.ihe.be). The SBB watches punctually that the discussions
taking place in the scientiﬁc committees advising the Biosafety Advisory
Council conform to European and Belgian regulations. With regard to the
dossiers we analysed in 2002, for instance, the chairperson cut short dis-
cussions concerning the scientiﬁc and societal use of the intended GMO
releases and their possible damage for organic agriculture. The Biosafety
Advisory Council gave a positive advice to all of the six new authorization
requests for ﬁeld trials it received in 2002. The Competent Authority,
however, admitted only four of them, thereby responding to concerns of
the wider Belgian public. It created, thus, a discrepancy between Belgian
regulatory guidelines and regulatory practice. During 2003 and 2004,
hardly any authorization requests for deliberate releases were submitted in
Belgium. The enterprises lost their conﬁdence in existing authorization
processes. In the Belgian context – as in the context of other European
member states – the European intention to install a precautionary procedure
for the treatment of authorization requests that results in transparent and
consistent decisions failed. Apparently, precautionary procedures that
are based on a scientiﬁc assessment of the biosafety of intended releases
do not suﬃce.
As we will show in the following sections, reasons for this failure are (1)
that precaution is not linked to predeﬁned goals, (2) that application of
precaution depends on a particular technological application, rather than
the other way round, (3) that society perceives more risks and less beneﬁts
than the oﬃcial European precautionary attitude allows to, (4) that the
demand for consistency contradicts the idea of precaution as a continuous
learning process, (5) that the wider public is, until now, not seriously
involved in the deﬁnition of sustainability goals, risks and beneﬁts, and a
suitable variety of technological applications, and, last but not least (6) the
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European public distrusts the economic (and political) powers that push
forward present biotechnological innovations.
3.2. Precaution and its Substantial Orientation
The Bergen Ministerial Declaration states, ‘‘In order to achieve sustainable
development, policies must be based on the Precautionary Principle. Envi-
ronmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irrevers-
ible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation’’ (Declara-
tion of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, May 1990,
as cited in Sandin, 1999, p. 903). This declaration suggests that there is an
obvious link between (the environmental dimension of) sustainable devel-
opment and precaution, namely that a sustainable environment cannot be
reached without a precautionary attitude. We argue that the Precautionary
Principle, as it emerges in the European Communication,9 has been
unlinked from the (environmental dimension of the) ideal of sustainable
development.
3.2.1. Predeﬁned goals as the starting point for Precaution? According to
the Communication, the Precautionary Principle should aim at a balance
between the freedoms and rights of persons, enterprises, and organiza-
tions on the one hand and the necessity to limit the risks of negative
impacts on the environment and the health of humans, animals, and
plants on the other (COM, 2000, p. 1). As Jensen argues, this balancing
exercise ﬁts within an ethics of political liberalism (Jensen, 2002, pp. 40–
44). According to this ethics, public authorities should protect the rights
and freedoms of individuals and of legal entities such as enterprises and
organizations. The only reason for which persons may be restricted in
their actions by the use of coercion is to prevent unacceptable harm to
entities – in this case humans, animals, and plants – worthy of protec-
tion. The task of public authorities consists, within this liberal tradition,
of creating a general legal and institutional frame within which economic
actors are allowed to act and trade. Within this general liberal
9 The same, though, holds for many other policy documents. See, for instance, the
overview provided by Sandin (1999, pp. 902–905). Sandin himself does not link
precaution to sustainable development either. According to Sandin, who made an
analysis of several formulations of the Precautionary Principle, the central idea of the
Principle is that it is ‘‘mandatory to limit, regulate, or prevent potentially dangerous
actions before scientiﬁc proof is established’’ (Sandin, 1999, p. 890).
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framework, restrictions on free trade can only be justiﬁed in order to
prevent harm to third parties.
This interpretation does not consider precaution as related to a pub-
lic ethic. A public ethic takes societal goals – for instance, Sustainable
Development10 – as its starting point and deﬁnes, consequently, the rights
and freedoms of individuals and organizations in function of these societal
goals. The general legal and institutional context is intended to deﬁne
boundary conditions for the actions of economic actors that help, or at least
do not hamper, the realization of societal goals.
A liberal interpretation of Precaution implies a harm-, rather than goal-,
oriented approach. The Precautionary Principle is only applied when an
assumption of a potential risk exists (COM, 2000, p. 7). ‘‘The trigger for
precautionary action is that the desired level of protection for the envi-
ronment or health could be jeopardized’’ (McNelis, 2000, p. 547). The main
question is whether it is suﬃciently plausible that the particular application
will cause so much harm – independent from possible advantages – that a
precautionary approach is needed. It is the degree of uncertainty of plausible
and suﬃcient harm (suﬃcient evidence of suﬃcient harm) that triggers the
idea of Precaution (O’Brien, 2003).
This harm-oriented approach contends with a serious problem.
Detached from explicit goals, it is not clear what counts as ‘‘unac-
ceptable harm.’’ The identiﬁcation of potentially harmful eﬀects involves
unavoidably a number of value judgments. Judgments are, for instance,
made about which kinds of harm to assess and which to ignore, about
what baseline to use for assessing harm, and even about what counts as
a harmful impact (Carr, 2002, pp. 34–35). Should one, for example,
compare the impact of GM crops with the impact of conventional
agricultural practices or with the impact of organic agriculture (as
Austria proposes). Does one only count direct harm or also indirect
harm (such as the impact of changes in herbicide use as the result of the
introduction of herbicide-resistant crops). And does only harm to non-
agricultural land count as environmental harm or also (economic) harm
to agricultural land? As long as such lack of clarity remains concerning
what counts as ‘‘unacceptable harm,’’ the EU will hardly be able to
realize its objective to apply the Precautionary Principle in a consistent
way.
10 See, for instance, the Swedish Environmental Policy for a Sustainable Sweden
(Sweden Ministry of Environment 1997/89). The Swedish government established
ﬁfteen environmental quality objectives to accomplish the overall environmental
objective. These objectives were the outcome of extensive public discussion and
debate (O’Brien, 2003, p. 286).
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The Belgian Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO)
gives some short comments on the European liberal interpretation of
Precaution (FRDO, 2000). The Council states at the outset that a
legitimate application of the precautionary principle should be based on
societal priorities – Sustainable Development, democratically deﬁned
levels for the protection of the environment and human health. This
also implies that the domains of application of the principle exceed the
domain of health and environment. The Council ‘‘thinks it interesting to
contemplate applying the principle also in other domains where both
scientiﬁc uncertainty and a possibility of serious harm exist. This can be
in situations relating to social security, justice, social coherence, and this
both at national and global scale’’ (FRDO, 2000, p. 5).
3.2.2. Particular objectives or particular technologies as the starting point for
precaution? In the present European regulatory context, particular tech-
nological applications form the starting point for implementing a pre-
cautionary attitude. GMCs, for instance, are a type of technological
applications for which a precautionary attitude is deemed ﬁt. Biotech
industries object to this preselection. They argue that new crop varieties
should be evaluated according to their characteristics (as is the case in
Canada), not according to the kind of technology with which they were
created. They oppose, hence, the a priori precautionary approach taken
with regard to GMCs (and, thus, the necessity of a separate authoriza-
tion procedure), while new crop varieties with comparable characteristics
that are, however, created with more conventional techniques are seem-
ingly not to blame. In line with this course of reasoning, they stress the
importance of the principle of familiarity in order to evaluate potential
risks of GMCs. (In the European Deliberate Releases Directives, the
principle of familiarity is mentioned as the second priority, next to the
principle of precaution, to assess authorization requests.)
From a liberal interpretation of precaution, the restriction of an
a priori precautionary approach to particular types of technological
applications is, indeed, hard to justify. In case public authorities do not
deem it necessary to assess more conventional agricultural techniques,
one cannot easily provide counterarguments to the conviction of biotech
industries that a separate assessment procedure of GMCs is discrimi-
nating. Things change, however, when one interprets precaution as an
attitude in the service of predeﬁned sustainability goals. In case one takes
predeﬁned goals, rather than particular technological applications, as the
starting point and develops and selects technological applications in
function of these goals, precaution should apply to the whole variety of
technological applications that are selected (rather than to none of them,
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as biotech industries – in line with their liberal interpretation of pre-
caution – suggest).11
3.2.3. An integral evaluation. A precautionary attitude in the service of sus-
tainable development implies an integral evaluation. This means (a) that not
only environmental and health aspects of technological applications are eval-
uated, but also social, economic, and ethical ones, (b) that the technologies’
risks or not assessed independent from their possible advantages, but that a
weighing of risks and beneﬁts takes place, and (c) that the risks and beneﬁts of
one technological application are compared to the risks and beneﬁts of other
suitable technological alternatives given particular sustainability goals.
At ﬁrst sight the European Communication seems not to oppose this idea
of an integral evaluation. Three considerations, described in the Communi-
cation, are important to mention here. First, regarding the criterion of pro-
portionality – measures should bear a proper proportion to the intended
protection level – the Communication suggests that possibilities to replace
intended products or processes by less dangerous ones should be taken into
consideration (cf. c). Second, regarding the criterion of weighing costs and
beneﬁts it states, to begin with, that a balancing of costs and beneﬁts should
not consider only economic data, though an economic cost-beneﬁt analysis
should be part of the investigation whenever such an analysis is feasible and
desirable. And, what is more important, it states further that an analysis of
the eﬀectiveness of several possible options and of their acceptability for the
public should be examined, since it is conceivable that society is prepared to
pay a higher price in order to guarantee an interest deemed primordial (cf. b).
Third, regarding the criterion of considering scientiﬁc developments, the
Communication puts forward that one should look for better methods and
instruments for risk-evaluation that include all relevant factors such as, for
instance, social-economic information and technological perspectives (cf. a).
The problem is, however, that these considerations only get meaning in
the phase of deciding on appropriate precautionary measures, i.e., after a
previous risk assessment with regard to a particular technological appli-
cation has taken place and the conclusion fell that suﬃcient evidence of
11 This tension between a harm- and a goal-oriented interpretation of precaution is
illustrated in the following example. While some proponents of GM crops and food
argue against additional precautions on the grounds that such precautions are not
imposed on conventional crops and food even though they have some adverse im-
pacts, some European member states (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) take a diﬀerent
view. They believe that GM crops should only be approved if they are likely to
reduce the environmental impact of conventional agriculture or, at least, do not
preclude more sustainable forms of agricultural production being adopted in future
(Carr, 2002, p. 36).
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suﬃcient harm exists. According to a liberal interpretation of precaution,
the conclusion that unacceptable risks exist is, indeed, a precondition for
applying precautionary measures.
In such a harm-oriented approach, the search for alternative techno-
logical applications cannot begin before the plausibility of suﬃcient harm is
established. This implies that alternative technologies are not considered
when the harmfulness of a speciﬁc technological activity – either or not with
the help of small restrictions or adjustments – remains below a certain level
that is deemed acceptable (O’Brien, 2003). The preceding risk assessments to
be made, according to Directive 2001/18, are limited to environmental im-
pacts, ‘‘thereby missing the economic and social dimensions of sustainable
development’’ (Karlsson, 2003, p. 22).12
A harm-oriented approach implies, moreover, that, in case consideration
of possible alternatives does happen, it begins late and in an unsystematic
way. One tends, ﬁrst, to investigate only those alternatives that bear close
resemblance to the initial technology (Karlsson, 2003, p. 20; O’Brien, 2003).
Second, experts of advisory bodies are often not in a position to compare
alternatives: they have to advise on products that are already on the market
or that will be introduced very soon, or possible alternatives (and, hence,
their potential risks and beneﬁts) are hardly known. The fact that many
R&D activities, taking place within private enterprises, are subject to secrecy
clauses does not stimulate a scientiﬁc comparison of possible alternatives.
Third, in some cases, European regulation even forbids a comparison of
alternatives. It is, for instance, legally not allowed to prohibit a pesticide
because it is less good than an existing alternative.13
3.3. Precaution and its Procedural Form
3.3.1. A continuous learning process. A goal-oriented approach presupposes
(even more than a harm-oriented one) a continuous learning process, for
scientists concerned as well as for citizens and policy people (O’Brien, 2003).
Since the implementation of various alternatives involves many uncertain-
ties, a continuous monitoring of eﬀects is necessary. Some alternatives can
be more and others less harmful than initially expected. Or it can turn out
that one urgently needs to look for new alternatives. Co-operation from
all sides of a society and transparent participatory political processes are
needed to implement such learning processes.
12 See also the strict attitude of the Belgian SBB, as discussed in Section 3.1: the
SBB does not allow a discussion on economic impacts, nor on potential scientiﬁc or
societal advantages of the intended releases.
13 See for the Belgian situation, for instance, the reports ‘Casus Hoge
Gezondheidsraad’ en ‘Casus Bioveiligheidsraad’ on www.ua.ac.be/SPIRE.
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This idea of a continuous learning process is at odds with the guiding
principles of non-discrimination and coherence, as suggested by the Commis-
sion. The Belgian FRDO joins in with these principles, because of the desir-
ability of a harmonization on a European level. Its defense of these principles
can, however, harm its own interpretation that the precautionary principle
should respond to previously deﬁned societal objectives. Changing societal
concerns and changing scientiﬁc information can indeed ask for stricter pre-
cautionarymeasures thanhad been applied in the past in comparable situations.
With Carr, we can, moreover, question what are ‘‘comparable situations’’ if
they are not linked to predeﬁned goals. ‘‘For example, proponents of GMcrops
and food believe they are no diﬀerent from the equivalent conventional prod-
ucts, so consider that precautionary measures are unjustiﬁed. Critics argue that
there are substantial diﬀerences that justify precaution’’ (Carr, 2002, p. 36).
3.3.2. Integration of public concerns and vision. In its Communication, the
European Commission hardly considers the possible contribution of the
wider public to risk evaluation and management. The Commission refers, at
one passage, to the fact that the EU and its member states signed the Aarhus
Convention in June 1988. According to the Commission, the importance of
this Convention relates to its defense of transparency, accessibility of infor-
mation, and involvement of all relevant parties with the investigation of the
various possibilities for risk management ‘‘as soon as the results of the sci-
entiﬁc evaluation and/or risk evaluation are available’’ (COM, 2000, p. 10).
The GMO Directive 2001/18 also opens the way for public participation,
at least to the extent of consultation of the public and interest groups. In what
precise way this consultation will be carried out is left to the member states
themselves to decide. As Karlsson suggests, however, the present system for
assessments of GMOs, ‘‘with its strong focus on scientiﬁc, so-called objective,
risk assessments, worked out by experts within authorities that have limited
contact with the surrounding society,’’ is insuﬃcient for at least three reasons
(Karlsson, 2003, p. 21, compare with Carr, 2002, pp. 36–37). ‘‘First, such a
system clearly neglects the value dimension of issues related to sustainable
development, and gives less legitimacy to the perceptions of the public than to
the so-called objective aspects. Second, since the actual subjectivity and values
of the experts are not oﬃcially acknowledged, their evaluations might unin-
tentionally be given too much weight in relation to the evaluations of other
stakeholders. Third, the striving for assessments in exclusively scientiﬁc, often
only quantiﬁable, terms easily and frequently results in a tendency among
experts to overlook other aspects, such as the social dimension of the concept
of sustainable development.’’
The Belgian FRDO takes public involvement with the implementation of
a precautionary approach more serious than the European Commission
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does.14 According to the FRDO applying precaution implies transparency
and democratic legitimacy in the three dimensions characterizing policy
processes: the scientiﬁc knowledge regarding potential harm, the decision to
apply the precautionary principle, the deﬁnition of possible precautionary
measures (FRDO, 2000, p. 4).
With regard to the ﬁrst dimension, the FRDO defends, ﬁrst, transparency
regarding procedures and substance of the scientiﬁc investigation (FRDO,
2000, p. 7). It asks, second, to inform on the simpliﬁcations, estimations, and
choices to neglect some aspects. ‘‘Even in case one can justify these simpliﬁ-
cations or estimations from a scientiﬁc perspective, one should interpret them
within a context of societal choices and priorities.’’ The FRDO asks, third,
that the scientiﬁc information mentions explicitly credible scientiﬁc minority
advices (FRDO, 2000, p. 9). It asks, fourth, to provide room for contributions
of social sciences, in order to oﬀer decision makers insights into the risk
perceptions of the wider public. It argues, ﬁfth, for the organization of a
public debate following the scientiﬁc debate. It defends, ﬁnally, to take also
other than scientiﬁc expertise – ‘‘the experience of people who are confronted
with the problem presumed’’ – into consideration.
The second dimension regards the political decision whether a potential
risk is acceptable or not. According to the FRDO, the decision process
should be based on the protection levels and the priorities laid down by
society via democratic processes. In order to deﬁne these protection levels
and priorities, investigation of the use of the product or process at stake and
of possible alternatives in order to fulﬁl the same objectives with less chance
of harm are needed. ‘‘This investigation should ﬁt in with the needs of
society in the frame of sustainable development’’ (FRDO, 2000, p. 9).
The FRDO does not argue explicitly for transparency and societal
legitimacy where it discusses the third dimension, namely deﬁning appro-
priate precautionary measures.
3.3.3. Transparency concerning the economic context with its particular power
relationships? According to the European stakeholder dialogue on bio-
technology, organized by IMSA Amsterdam together with Monsanto, the
majority of stakeholders interviewed oppose the introduction of GM
products in Europe, not because they oppose biotechnology per se, but
because they resent the biotech industry’s behavior.15 They resent, for
example, its failure to address basic fears and emotions concerning GM
technology. Another point of critique is the lack of choice between GM and
14 ‘‘The Council is, however, of the opinion that the conditions that guarantee this
transparency and involvement are circumscribed very vaguely in the text of the
Commission. It is advisable to clarify them’’ (FRDO, 2000, p. 8).
15 www.imsa.nl consulted on July 13, 2004.
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non-GM food. Environmental risk is stakeholders’ main concern, especially
the gene ﬂow potential of the inserted gene construct. And generally no
clear beneﬁts from the technology are perceived for European agriculture.
All this shows that the European public does not trust the biotech industry,
because it has no say in the choices made to develop one particular bio-
technological application rather than another and because they distrust the
motives on which industry’s actual choices are based.
The EU itself takes an ambiguous attitude towards biotechnology.
Contradictions between regulation and promotion contribute to fostering
public controversy (Todt, 2004, p. 144). Indeed, sustainable development is
but one of the factors driving present European regulation, next to com-
petitiveness (and governance) (Lo¨fstedt, 2004, p. 237). Europe seems, in fact,
to worry more about the maintenance or strengthening of its biotechnology
sector than about sustainable development.16 It experiences, moreover,
international pressure – via the WTO and the USA – to pursue a more
ﬂexible GMO-policy.17 In such circumstances it goes without saying that the
16 ‘‘European Commission provides plan for the promotion of biotechnology. The
EU cannot any longer aﬀord insinuations regarding biotechnology as a whole. The
public should become more aware of the advantages. This is in the report ‘Life
Sciences and Biotechnology: A strategy for Europe’ that is accepted on Wednesday
January 23 (2002) by the European Commission. The European Commission esti-
mates that biotechnological applications will represent a market value of 200 billion
Euro in 2010. The commission warns in her report that this turnover will mainly be
made outside the EU. In the USA public concerns about biotechnology are less
strong and it has a turnover that is three times higher and almost three times as much
people have a job in this sector. The report contains 35 pages with measures that
have to be taken by the European Commission, the European Parliament, national
governments and industry. One suggestion is to start an information campaign to
make people more conscious of the advantages for the environment, health and food
security’’ (Newsletter nr. 03, week 4, 2002 of Consument en Biotechnologie, http://
www.consubiotech.nl).
17 ‘‘Transatlantic tensions rising over GM foods. EU trade commissioner Pascal
Lamy has urged America not to take legal actions against Europe’s moratorium on
genetically modiﬁed (GM) product licensing amid rising signs that the USA could be
about to launch a new trade war. The European Commission is reiterating its calls for
member states to lift the moratorium. EU governments have refused to approve any
new GM crops or similar biotech products since 1998. The USA believes the policy has
no scientiﬁc foundation. But it has fought shy of launching a legal challenge through
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), fearing this would antagonise EU countries
while not achieving its aim of opening up the European market … According to a
recent report in the Wall Street Journal newspaper, a proposal for legal action could
emerge formally early next year. US trade minister Robert Zoellick is said to favour
this course. The EU’s Pascal Lamy responded to the rising tide of US frustration on
Friday, urging America to think twice before launching a complaint…’’ (Environment
Daily, issue 1351, December 16, 2002, http://www.environmentdaily.com).
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EU is more willing to lend its ear to the lobbying work of biotechnology
ﬁrms than to the skeptical voices (or even destructive actions) of its citizens.
4. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PRECAUTIONARY
POLICY IN THE SERVICE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
In the following paragraphs, we consider how to adjust public policy in the
ﬁeld of genetically modiﬁed crops in order to make it more compatible with
a precautionary attitude that is oriented towards the goal of Sustainable
Development.
4.1. Participatory Exercises
We argued that precaution is an attitude that should stand in the service of a
public and publicly deﬁned ethic of sustainable development. A ﬁrst task of
public authorities consists, hence, in organizing participatory exercises in
order to make people’s sustainability goals and the arguments and values
supporting them explicit. These participatory exercises cannot be done once
and for all, since citizens’ values and concerns change, not least because of
their experience with changing technical and scientiﬁc possibilities. These
participatory exercises should not aim at a straightforward consensus either.
They should aim at a defensible and feasible degree of value-pluralism.
In actual policy processes, the power of the better argument (for which
participatory exercises are meant) have to compete with the power of the
market. In order to restrict the latter power, it is important to make eco-
nomic (and, hence, political) power relationships explicit. This can be done
by presenting a social map of the various actors concerned, including their
ﬁnancial position and economic interests that are related to deliberate
releases of particular GMCs. Without these data public policy cannot really
be called transparent. Without these data, the wider public lacks essential
information to step in a public debate that gets down to the very core of the
matter. Co-operation between public authorities and (economic) journalists
in order to compose such social map seems appropriate here.
4.2. Authorization Policy
We explained that an integral evaluation – weighing of (possible) risks and
beneﬁts, comparing technological alternatives – that, moreover, integrates
public concerns is a precondition for a goal-oriented precautionary attitude.
Publicly deﬁned sustainability goals should, hence, form the general
framework for authorization procedures regarding particular GMO-dossiers.
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This framework can stimulate a more coherent scientiﬁc evaluation of possible
harm. Without such framework, even scientists within natural-scientiﬁc advi-
sory dissent about the concrete meaning of ‘‘harm,’’ depending on their (dis-
ciplinary) paradigm and their personal norms and values. The same reasoning
holds for the evaluation of ‘‘beneﬁts.’’ In order to be able toweigh possible risks
and beneﬁts, not only the meaning of ‘‘risk,’’ but also of ‘‘beneﬁt’’ should be
connected to goals that are publicly made explicit. In order to weigh risks and
beneﬁts, not only natural-scientiﬁc, but also social-scientiﬁc information is
needed, since harm and beneﬁt can also have social, economic, or ethical
dimensions.Althoughanauthorizationprocedure unavoidably has a particular
GMC as its starting point, it should, moreover, not exclude comparisons with
technological alternatives that can help serve the same goals.
According to Mitcham and von Schomberg (2000), general public debate
must be complemented with speciﬁc deliberative procedures, for instance
deliberative technology assessment procedures, in order to respond to the
speciﬁc challenges posed by particular technological applications. Consen-
sus-conferences are one example of such assessment procedures that con-
stitute an interface between science and politics.
4.3. Research and Innovation Policy
An authorization procedure can only be based on an integral evaluation on
condition that research and innovation policy stimulates technological
diversity against the background of publicly deﬁned sustainability goals
(and diversity in the practices to which the respective technologies belong).
From the perspective of precaution, technological diversity is possibly as
important as biodiversity.
Research and innovation policy should, further, anticipate a harmoni-
zation between the promotion and regulation of new biotechnological
applications. It should not only stimulate scientiﬁc and technological re-
search that can result in commercial products. It should also guarantee that
suﬃcient uncertainty research is carried out in order to ﬁll up essential
knowledge gaps.
4.4. Economic Policy: Redeﬁnition of the Freedoms and Rights of Producers
(and Consumers)
Producers have a responsibility to make sure that their R&D activities are
compatible with the goal of Sustainable Development. In order to realize such
compatibility they need to know what citizens expect and what they are
worrying about. This presupposes, indeed, that public authorities organize
public debates where needed and provide private enterprises with clear
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guidelines. R&D departments should, consequently, be made responsible for
integrating these guidelines into the whole R&D process. They should also be
made responsible for providing the wider public and relevant competent
authorities with clear information concerning the environmental, social,
economic, and ethical risks and beneﬁts of their technological innovation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We approve of the EU’s intention to implement a transparent and coherent
GMO policy. In this article we argue, however, that an interpretation that
places the precautionary principle – in line with its liberal tradition – within
the framework of risk analysis falls short in this respect, given present sci-
entiﬁc and societal controversy. We defend an interpretation of precaution
that is explicitly linked to the ideal of sustainable development. Precaution is
then understood as an attitude, with particular substantial and procedural
characteristics, that contributes to the realization of sustainable develop-
ment. This goal-oriented interpretation of precaution serves the purpose of
coherence and transparency better, though its coherence consists more of an
adequate response to the ongoing evolution of societal valuations and
technological potentials than of an adherence to past decisions.
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